Remarks at the 2026 International NPT Conference. Moscow, March 12-14, 2026
It is not expedient to hammer out the Newest START (or as START-4 in Russian terminology) for 10 key reasons:
1. There are 15 unresolved acute arms control issues, including nuclear arms control issues between Eastern and Western nations possessing nuclear weapons.
2. There are open NATO threats to unleash an all-out-war against Russia and its allies, including a nuclear war, at the end of the current decade.
3. There are two massive aggressions waged by the USA/NATO against Russia via Ukraine, and against Iran
4. Six NATO states [Denmark, Finland, Germany (additionally), Poland, Sweden and the UK] wish to acquire the U.S. and French nuclear capabilities, to be used against Russia.
5. The U.S. extended nuclear deterrence for Europe has been enhanced by a similar nuclear strategy articulated by France in 2026.
6. The U.S. B-61-12 nuclear bombs that can perform tactical and strategic missions have been already deployed in Europe; a new type B-61-13 with 360 kt will be delivered soon.
7. The USA has already sold in Europe more aircraft capable to deliver both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, including around 600 F-35A “dual-capable aircraft”.
8. The USA is still committed to deliver a first nuclear strike on Russia, the PRC and some other independent nations.
9. The USA is still delivering conventional deadly weapons to Ukraine via the EU/NATO that kill not only Russian military men, but also civilian population, civil medical centers and educational facilities.
10. The USA has declared the policy to conduct "victorious" military operations in outer space, intending to ensure its military superiority and domination.
Arms control in general terms, and nuclear arms control in particular: a) could be an effective tool provided that they are honest, comprehensive, verifiable and balanced processes, taking into account national interests of the participating nations and avoiding unilateral benefits and dominance; b) such processes cannot be selective meaning that when one type of arms is destroyed while other types of arms are neglected; c) any nuclear arms control process would be useless and counter-productive during military attacks, armed aggressions and conflicts; d) such process should be complemented by other armed control issues not covered by the current arms control regime (e.g. the UAV arms control measures prohibiting their use against civilians and civilian infrastructure).
Moscow should announce that all its “8 +” perspective weapons cannot be reduced or limited due to refusal of the USA to reduce or limit the U.S. Navy, forward-based TNW in Europe and Asia, global missile defense and space-based strike weapons.
Conclusion:
From the point of view of national security, Russia cannot reduce its strategic offensive arms (SOA) and tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) at a time when the USA is undermining the foundations of the global strategic stability; maintaining the strategy of launching a first nuclear strike against Russia and the strategy of "the extended nuclear deterrence" on a global scale in the form of a "nuclear umbrella"; blurring the objective interrelationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms. The USA deploys its nuclear weapons in Europe near the territory of Russia and conduct military exercises in Europe and Asia with the use of strategic and TNW; has "nuclear sharing accords” with some NATO countries. The USA is also creating the Golen Dome global land/sea-based, and space-based missile defense system.
The Russian Federation cannot reduce any kind of its nuclear weapons in the present dramatic global environment. Such policy if effected will be a great blunder bringing Russia and its allies into irreparable disaster. Russia will need to retain such arms in case of emergency until the overall international military and political situation improves.
Written by Vladimir Kozin, Member, Russian Academy of Military Sciences and Academy of Natural Sciences.
