

**PPT Attachment to Report # 173.**  
**New facts on the US violation of the BWC**  
November 28, 2022





# Implementation of US military and biological programmes in Ukraine

8

## Implementation of projects under the Biological Threat Reduction Programme




### TAP-2

Serological monitoring of glanders in Ukraine and evaluation of its diagnostic methods

### TAP-3

Analysis of the risks of spreading African swine fever and swine flu virus among wild pigs in Ukraine

## Transfer of microbial strains and biomaterials to other countries



### UP-2 Pathogen mapping

**UP-4**  
Study of the possibility of spreading highly dangerous pathogens through migratory birds

**UP-8**  
Study on the prevalence of Congo-Crimean haemorrhagic fever virus and hantaviruses

**UP-10**  
Study on the spread of African swine fever in Ukraine in the wild and via trade routes

BUILDING A WORLD OF DIFFERENCE®

BLACK & VEATCH

HDTRA1-08-D-0007-Phase IIB - Country Science Plan  
CDRL A017 Nov. 08-June 2009

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HDTRA1-08-D-0007-Phase IIB - Country Science Plan  
CDRL A017 Nov. 08-June 2009

Ukraine Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP)

Program (BTRP) Phase IIB

HDTRA1-08-D-0007-  
0004

CDRL A017

Country Science Plan (CSP)

Prepared for:

Prepared by:

BLACK & VEATCH SPECIAL PROJECTS CORP.

In collaboration with Metabiota, Inc.

Nov. 08

Submitted 17 June 2009

Table 1. CSP Project Status

Project Designation	Project Title	Planned	Ongoing	Completed	Not Planned
CDRL UP-1	Final Evaluation of the Potential for Spread of Glanders in Ukraine (CDRL UP-1)				
CDRL UP-2	Investigation of the Potential for Spread of Glanders in Ukraine (CDRL UP-2)				
CDRL UP-3	Investigation of the Potential for Spread of Glanders in Ukraine (CDRL UP-3)				
CDRL UP-4	Investigation of the Potential for Spread of Glanders in Ukraine (CDRL UP-4)				
CDRL UP-5	Investigation of the Potential for Spread of Glanders in Ukraine (CDRL UP-5)				
CDRL UP-6	Investigation of the Potential for Spread of Glanders in Ukraine (CDRL UP-6)				
CDRL UP-7	Investigation of the Potential for Spread of Glanders in Ukraine (CDRL UP-7)				
CDRL UP-8	Investigation of the Potential for Spread of Glanders in Ukraine (CDRL UP-8)				
CDRL UP-9	Investigation of the Potential for Spread of Glanders in Ukraine (CDRL UP-9)				
CDRL UP-10	Investigation of the Potential for Spread of Glanders in Ukraine (CDRL UP-10)				

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Table 2. TAP-2 Status

Project Designation	Project Title	Planned	Ongoing	Completed	Not Planned
T01 Human TAP-2	Investigation of the Potential for Spread of Glanders in Ukraine (CDRL UP-1)				
T02 Veterinary TAP-2	Investigation of the Potential for Spread of Glanders in Ukraine (CDRL UP-2)				
T03 Veterinary TAP-2	Investigation of the Potential for Spread of Glanders in Ukraine (CDRL UP-3)				
T04 Veterinary TAP-2	Investigation of the Potential for Spread of Glanders in Ukraine (CDRL UP-4)				
T05 Veterinary TAP-2	Investigation of the Potential for Spread of Glanders in Ukraine (CDRL UP-5)				
T06 Veterinary TAP-2	Investigation of the Potential for Spread of Glanders in Ukraine (CDRL UP-6)				
T07 Veterinary TAP-2	Investigation of the Potential for Spread of Glanders in Ukraine (CDRL UP-7)				
T08 Veterinary TAP-2	Investigation of the Potential for Spread of Glanders in Ukraine (CDRL UP-8)				
T09 Veterinary TAP-2	Investigation of the Potential for Spread of Glanders in Ukraine (CDRL UP-9)				
T10 Veterinary TAP-2	Investigation of the Potential for Spread of Glanders in Ukraine (CDRL UP-10)				

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### P-781

Studying the spectrum of pathogens spread by bats

### P-3007

Studying the spread of dangerous waterborne pathogens


### P-364

Assessment of infections spread by arthropods in Ukraine

### P-444

Monitoring of avian influenza, Newcastle disease, paramyxoviruses among wild birds

## Conducting research on Ukrainian military personnel and the mentally ill



## Concealing joint US-Ukrainian military-biological activities



Annual submissions to the UN make no mention of joint U.S.-Ukraine activities












## DTRA updated strategy



## Concealment of information about Black & Veatch activities in Ukraine



Information on the personal data of contractors' staff and training participants, research activities in Ukraine and their results has been completely removed from the reports





# COVID-19 pathogen study at Boston University



5

Creation of a modified virus based on the Omicron strain and the original 'Wuhan' variant, causing 80% mortality in model animals



**EXCLUSIVE: 'This is playing with fire - it could spark a lab-generated pandemic': Experts slam Boston lab where scientists have created a new deadly Omicron strain with an 80% kill rate in mice**

- Researchers added Omicron's spike protein to the original Wuhan Covid strain
- Omicron's spike is highly mutated which made it the most infectious variant ever
- Omicron is also far less deadly, causing mild disease in most affected animals
- Study intended to discover if spike protein determines deadliness of infection
- 8 in 10 mice infected with the lab-created strain died at Boston University lab
- This compares with a 100% fatality rate in mice infected with the Wuhan strain

By CAITLYN TILLEY, HEALTH REPORTER FOR DAILYMAIL.COM and MANSUR SHAHEEN, DEPUTY HEALTH EDITOR FOR DAILYMAIL.COM  
PUBLISHED: 16:07 GMT, 17 October 2022 | UPDATED: 22:03 GMT, 28 October 2022

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Boston University scientists were today condemned for 'playing with fire' after it emerged they had created a lethal new Covid strain in a laboratory.

DailyMail.com revealed the team had made a hybrid virus — combining Omicron and the original Wuhan strain — that killed 80 per cent of mice in a study.

The researchers were attempting to discover whether the spike protein on the Omicron variant — responsible for making it the most transmissible of Covid strains to date — is also behind the virus having a particularly mild effect on infected hosts, with most suffering only slight illness.

The resultant chimera was only slightly less deadly than the Wuhan strain, indicating that the spike protein is not behind the attenuation of its effects on hosts.

The team behind its creation announced that as well as 'inflict[ing] severe disease' it also 'robustly escapes vaccine-induced humoral immunity', indicating that the recombinant virus retained the most dangerous properties of its parents.

The revelation exposes how dangerous virus manipulation research continues to go on even in the US, despite fears similar practices may have started the pandemic.

Professor Shmuel Shapira, a leading scientist in the Israeli Government, said: 'This should be totally forbidden. It's playing with fire.'



Gain of function research — when viruses are purposefully manipulated to be more infectious or deadly — is thought to be at the center of Covid's origin.



Boston University's National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories is one of 13 biosafety level 4 labs in the US



80 percent of mice died from the new man-made Covid strain, while none died from the milder Omicron variant alone, researchers at Boston University's National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories found



**Mass Media comments**

**STAT**

**Boston University researchers' testing of lab-made version of Covid virus draws government scrutiny**

Research at Boston University that involved testing a lab-made hybrid version of the SARS-CoV-2 virus is garnering heated headlines alleging the scientists involved could have unleashed a new pathogen.

There is no evidence the work, performed under biosafety level 3 precautions in BU's National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories, was conducted improperly or unsafely. In fact, it was approved by an internal biosafety review committee and Boston's Public Health Commission, the university said Monday night.

But it has become apparent that the research team did not clear the work with the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, which was one of the funders of the project. The agency indicated it is going to be looking for some answers as to why it first learned of the work through media reports.


Emily Erbelding, director of NIAID's division of microbiology and infectious diseases, said the BU team's original grant applications did not specify that the scientists wanted to do this precise work. Nor did the group make clear that it was doing experiments that might involve enhancing a pathogen of pandemic potential in the progress reports it provided to NIAID.

Asked if the research team should have informed NIAID of its intention to do the work, Erbelding said: "We wish that they would have, yes."

**US creates a deadly COVID variant**

**US CREATES A DEADLY COVID VARIANT**





## John Robert Bolton II

US statesman and politician, national security advisor to the US president from 2018 to 2019, co-director of the NGO Project for the New American Century.

In 2001, he headed the US delegation to the BWC's Fifth Review Conference, when the US rejected new regulations and procedures for verifying potential biological weapons locations, claiming threats to US national interests.

## REBUILDING AMERICA'S DEFENSES

Strategy, Forces and Resources  
For a New Century

A Report of  
The Project for the New American Century  
September 2000

Of defense reviews over the past decade, perhaps the most notable is that a consensus emerged: to date, there have been half a dozen formal defense reviews, and the Pentagon is now gearing up for a seventh Quadrennial Defense Review in 2001. Unless this "QDR" matches U.S. military forces and resources to a viable American strategy, it, too, will fail.

These failures are not without cause: already, they place at risk an historic opportunity. After the victories of the past century – two world wars, the Cold War and most recently the Gulf War – the United States finds itself as the uniquely powerful leader of a coalition of free and prosperous states that faces no immediate great-power challenges.

The American people have proven itself peaceful, stable and durable. It has, over the past decade, provided the geopolitical framework for widespread economic growth and the spread of American principles of liberty and democracy. Yet no nation in international politics can be secure in time, even a global one, if it cannot will its power itself.

Of an extended "postwar bubble" that has created a false sense of security, the report states that the postwar bubble is not a permanent condition. It is a temporary phenomenon, and the United States must be prepared to face a world in which the United States is not the sole superpower. The report also notes that the United States must be prepared to face a world in which the United States is not the sole superpower.

This is no paradox. It is the inevitable consequence of the failure to reach military means to geopolitical ends. Underlying the failed strategic and defense reviews of the past decade is the idea that the collapse of

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the Soviet Union had created a "strategic pause." In other words, with another great-power challenger emerging, the United States can enjoy a respite from the demands of international leadership. Like a horse between championship bouts, America can afford to relax and live the good life, certain that there would be enough time to stage up for the next big challenge. Thus the United States could afford to reduce its military forces, close bases overseas, halt major weapons programs and reap the financial benefits of the "peace dividend." But in reality, over the past decade, there has been no shortage of powers around the world who have taken the collapse of the Soviet empire as an opportunity to expand their own influence and challenge the American-led security order.

Beyond the faulty notion of a strategic pause, recent defense reviews have suffered from an inverted understanding of the military dimensions of the Cold War struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. American containment strategy did not proceed from the assumption that the Cold War would be a purely military struggle, in which the U.S. Army matched the Red Army tank for tank, rather, the United States would work to deter the Soviet military while defeating them economically and ideologically over time. And, even within the realm of military affairs, the practice of deterrence allowed for what in military terms is called "an economy of

	Cold War	21 <sup>st</sup> Century
Security system	Popular	Unpopular
Strategic goal	Contain Soviet Union	Protect For Americans
Main military mission	Deter Soviet expansion	Secure and expand zones of American power, deter rise of new great power competitor, defend key regions, exploit transformation of war
Main military doctrine	Potential global war across many theaters	Potential theater war spread across globe
Focus of strategic competition	Europe	East Asia

Over the decade of the post-Cold War period, however, almost everything has changed. The Cold War world was a bipolar world, the 21<sup>st</sup> century world is – for the moment at least – decidedly multipolar with

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## V CREATING TOMORROW'S DOMINANT FORCE

To preserve American military preeminence in the coming decades, the Department of Defense must move more aggressively to experiment with new technologies and operational concepts, and will to exploit the emerging revolution in military affairs. Information technologies, in particular, are becoming more prevalent and significant components of modern military systems. These information technologies are having the same kind of transforming effects on military affairs as they are having in the larger world. The effects of this military transformation will have profound implications for how wars are fought, what kinds of weapons will dominate the battlefield and, inevitably, which nations enjoy military preeminence.

The United States enjoys every prospect of leading this transformation. Indeed, it was the improvements in capabilities required during the American defense buildup of the 1960s that led to and then confirmed, during Operation Desert Storm, that a revolution in military affairs was at hand. At the same time, the process of military transformation will present opportunities for America's adversaries to develop new capabilities that in turn will create new challenges for U.S. military preeminence.

Moreover, the Pentagon, constrained by limited budgets and growing current missions, has been finding it difficult to experiment and transform itself in recent years. Spending on military research and development has been reduced dramatically over the past decade. Indeed, during the mid-1990s, when the Defense

Department was in the midst of the Reagan buildup which was primarily an effort to expand existing forces and field traditional weapons systems, research spending represented 20 percent of total Pentagon budgets. By contrast, today's research and development accounts total only 5 percent of defense spending. And even this reduced total is primarily for upgrades of current weapons. Without increased spending on basic research and development the United States will be unable to exploit the RMA and preserve its technological edge on future battlefields.

Any serious effort at transformation must occur within the larger framework of U.S. national security strategy, military missions and defense budgets. The United States cannot simply declare a "strategic pause" while experimenting with new technologies and operational concepts. Nor can it choose to pursue a transformation strategy that would demote American and allied interests.

A transformation strategy that will permit capabilities for projecting force from the United States, for example, and worldwide forward basing and presence, would be at odds with larger American

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and even unattended "missiles in a box" will allow not only for long-range power projection but for sustained power projection. Simulation technologies will vastly improve military training and mission planning.

Although it may take several decades for the process of transformation to unfold, in time, the art of warfare on air, land, and sea will be vastly different than it is today, and "combat" likely will take place in new dimensions: in space, "cyber-space," and perhaps the world of microbes. Air warfare may no longer be fought by pilots manning tactical fighter aircraft sweeping the skies of opposing fighters, but a regime dominated by long-range, stealthy unmanned craft. On land, the clash of massive, combined-arms armored forces may be replaced by the dashes of much lighter, stealthier and information-intensive forces, augmented by fleets of robots, some small enough to fit in soldiers' pockets. Control of the sea could be largely determined not by fleets of surface combatants and aircraft carriers, but from land- and space-based systems, forcing navies to maneuver and fight underwater. Space itself will become a theater of war, as nations gain access to space capabilities and come to rely on them; further, the distinction between military and commercial space systems – combatants and noncombatants – will become blurred. Information systems will become an important focus of attack, particularly for U.S. enemies seeking to short-circuit sophisticated American forces. And advanced forms of biological warfare that can "target" specific genotypes may transform biological warfare from the realm of terror to a politically useful tool.

This is merely a glimpse of the possibilities inherent in the process of transformation, not a precise prediction. Whatever the shape and direction of this revolution in military affairs, the implications for continued American military preeminence will be profound. As argued above, there are many reasons to believe that U.S. forces already possess nascent revolutionary capabilities, particularly in the realms of intel-

ligence, command and control, and long-range precision strikes. Indeed, these capabilities are sufficient to allow the armed services to begin an "interim," short- to medium-term process of transformation right away, creating new force designs and operational concepts – designs and concepts different than those contemplated by the current defense program – to maximize the capabilities that already exist. But these must be viewed as merely a way-station toward a more thoroughgoing transformation.

The individual services also need to be given greater bureaucratic and legal standing if they are to achieve these goals. Though a full discussion of this issue is outside the purview of this study, the reduced importance of the civilian secretaries of the military departments and the service chiefs of staff is increasingly inappropriate to the

**Until the process of transformation is treated as an enduring military mission – worthy of a constant allocation of dollars and forces – it will remain stillborn.**

demands of a rapidly changing technological, strategic and geopolitical landscape. The centralization of power under the Office of the Secretary of Defense and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Joint Staff, and the increased role of the theater commanders-in-chief, products of Cold-War-era defense reforms and especially the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, have created a process of defense decision-making that often elevates immediate concerns above long-term needs. In an era of uncertainty and transformation, it is more important to foster competing points of view about the how to apply new technologies to enduring missions.


This is especially debilitating to the process of transformation, which has

Project for the New American Century (PNAC) is an American neo-conservative non-profit political organisation set up in 1997 to promote American global leadership





## Рабочие документы Российской Федерации к Девятой обзорной конференции КБТО



## Российские инициативы по укреплению КБТО

**1. To reopen discussions for a legally binding protocol to the BWC that contains lists of viruses, poisons, and specialised equipment, takes into account contemporary biological research and technology, and includes an effective verification system**

**2. In the Confidence Building Measures:**  
**- to supplement Form A, part 2 (iv) with information on all biomedical research and development activities conducted outside national territory, including in cooperation with other States, including biomedical activities carried out with or on behalf of the special services (line ministries) of the State Party;**  
**- to supplement Form G with information on animal vaccine production facilities**

**3. To establish a scientific advisory committee with broad geographical representation and equal rights for participants to evaluate advances in science and technology related to the Convention**





voted	- 15
for	- 2
against	- 3
abstain	- 10



### Publications on the website of the US non-profit news organisation The Intercept about biosecurity breaches



**Experimenting With Disaster Part 1**

EXPLORE ALL PARTS



**Experimenting With Disaster Part 2**

EXPLORE ALL PARTS




**Experimenting With Disaster Part 3**


EXPLORE ALL PARTS

**T**HE GRADUATE STUDENT was alone in the lab on a Saturday, handling a mouse infected with a debilitating virus, when the needle slipped. She wore two gowns, two pairs of shoe covers, a hair net, a face mask, and two pairs of gloves. Gingerly, she had pointed the needle at the mouse's abdomen and injected the antibody. The animal was infected with a recombinant strain of Chikungunya virus, a mosquito-borne pathogen that has sparked epidemics in Africa and the Caribbean. Chikungunya can wreak havoc in other regions when the right kind of mosquito is present; in 2007 and 2007 there were outbreaks in Italy, and in 2014 the virus hit Florida, infecting 11 people who had not recently traveled abroad. In January 2016, nine months before the researcher stood in the lab that weekend, a locally acquired infection was diagnosed in Texas.


**A**T THE MOMENT that the ferret bit him, the researcher was smack in the middle of Manhattan, in a lab one block from Central Park's East Meadow. It was the Friday afternoon before Labor Day in 2011, and people were rushing out of the city for a long weekend. Three days earlier, the ferret had been inoculated with a recombinant strain of 1918 influenza, which killed between 20 and 30 million people when it swept through the world at the end of World War I. To prevent it from sparking another pandemic, 1918 influenza is studied under biosafety level 3 conditions, the second-highest of biosafety controls available. The researcher at Mount Sinai School of Medicine (now Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai) was wearing protective equipment, including two pairs of gloves. But the ferret bit hard enough to pierce through both pairs, breaking the skin of his left thumb.

**I**T STARTED WITH a bold idea. "Someone finally convinced me to do something really, really stupid," virologist Ron Fouchier told *Scientific American* in 2011. Fouchier, of Erasmus Medical Center in Rotterdam, and another scientist, Yoshihiro Kawakita of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, had separately tweaked the H5N1 virus — an influenza that primarily infects birds — in a way that made it spread more easily in ferrets. H5N1 is a prime pandemic candidate, and ferrets are often used as proxies for humans in flu experiments. When word got out that the two scientists were planning to publish papers detailing their experiments, making a blueprint available to the world, the outcry was extreme. The scientists were trying to better understand H5N1 in order to prevent a pandemic, but critics worried that their experiments could instead cause one — or provide would-be bioterrorists with an outbreak manufacturing guide.

- 
- In 2013, a researcher at Kansas State University in Manhattan, Kansas, pricked their finger while drawing blood from a chicken infected with H5N1 avian influenza. The scientist had handed a used syringe to an assistant while trying to get a better grasp of the chicken's jugular vein. The assistant returned it needle side out, piercing through the scientist's gloves. The researcher was prescribed Tamiflu for one week and told to immediately report a fever. Kansas State University did not respond to a request to comment.
  - Between April 2013 and March 2014, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill reported five mouse escapes, including one of an animal that had been infected with SARS four days earlier. In a letter to NIH, a biosafety specialist argued that the frequency of escapes was due to the "complex research taking place at our institute" rather than a failure of training, noting that several teams at the university use a breed of transgenic mouse known for its unpredictable behavior. After the SARS-infected mouse darted under lab equipment, researchers cornered it with a broom and returned it to its cage. The University of North Carolina did not respond to a request to comment.

- 
- In 2016, a researcher at the Food and Drug Administration's Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research in Silver Spring, Maryland, contracted a MRSA infection, a condition that can become severe if left untreated, after working with the antibiotic-resistant bacteria MRSA in the lab. The researcher could not recall any mishaps that would have led to infection, a situation that experts say is common with laboratory-acquired infections. The FDA center did not respond to a request to comment.
  - In early 2020, amid the shortage in respirators and masks brought on by the pandemic, a lab at Tufts University conducted low-risk experiments with the H3N2 flu virus without proper equipment. A student spilled a test tube containing a small amount of virus, potentially exposing five people. None were initially wearing masks. (Two later put them on to clean up the spill.) H3N2 is a seasonal flu virus and not considered a dangerous pathogen, but in an email to Tufts, an administrator at NIH highlighted a series of omission and errors. These included the lab's failure to provide personal protective equipment, a lack of proper safety signage, and the failure of researchers to seek appropriate medical care after being exposed to the virus. The NIH administrator also recommended that the principal investigator be retrained. Tufts declined to comment.

### Reporting of various biosafety incidents



On 2 September 2011, a researcher at the US National Institutes of Health in New York was sent home without observation after being bitten by a laboratory animal infected with a recombinant influenza virus

In September 2016, while conducting experiments with animals infected with a recombinant strain of the Chikungunya virus, a graduate student at the University of Washington punctured her glove, only to report it four days later

On 9 and 16 November 2013, two accidents involving modified strains of HPV occurred in a laboratory at the University of Wisconsin

### Deterioration of the epidemiological situation at laboratory sites

Ukraine	2011, 2014-2015: Cholera outbreaks (933 cases)
	2016-2017: Botulism (205 cases, 49 deaths)
	2017: Hepatitis A outbreaks in Zaporozhye, Odessa region, Kharkov (106 people affected)
	2018: Anthrax outbreak near the I.I. Mechnikov Institute in Odessa (5 people affected).
Georgia	2020: Influenza-like virus in Kharkov sickens and kills military personnel within two days (more than 200 people sick, 20 dead)
	2008: Outbreak of ASF of unknown origin
	2013-2014: Congo-Crimean haemorrhagic fever outbreak in the absence of infected vectors
	2013-2015: Measles outbreak (11,000 cases)